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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
·FLORENCE HIRST NEWCOM.B, a retired 
teacher of the Ogden City Public Schools, for 
herself and all other retired Public School 
Teachers similarly situated. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY. PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACH-
ERS' RETIREMENT COMMISSION, H. A. 
MACFARLANE, .ALPHID HENDRICKSON, 
T. 0. SMITH, VIOLA M. CLANCY, GERARD 
KLOMP, LLOYD I. _ALVORD and JA1\IE:S A. 
LARSON, as members of Ogden City Public 
School Teachers' Retirement Commission. 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT 
~ Plaintiff, Florence Hirst Newcomb, a resident of 
Ogden, Weber County, Utah, was employed as a teacher 
in the Ogden City Public Schools for more than thirty-
one years. On the 15th day of June, 1938, she was a 
member in good standing of the Ogden City Public 
School Teachers' Retirement Association and had been 
such since its inception. During all of the years in 
whic.h she was employed as a teacher in Ogden City 
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Public Schools, deductions were made from her salary 
by the Board of Education of Ogden City, Utah, pur-
suant to statute and her contracts of employment, and 
paid into the said Teachers' Retirement Association. 
On the 15th day of June, 1938, she having taught in the 
Public Schools of Ogden City, Utah, for more than 
thirty-one years prior thereto, and having attained the 
age of sixty (60) years, was retired as a member of 
said Ogden City Public School Teachers' Retirement 
Association and placed upon the retired list of the As-
sociation, and thereupon she became entitled to receive 
an annual annuity of $600.00. 
Upon her retirement, and up to the 30th of June, 
l 946, she was paid from the Association the full sum 
of $600.00 annually; and beginning with the fiscal year 
of July 1, 1946, and ending June 30, 1947, she was paid 
the sum of $592.00; and beginning with the fiscal year 
of July 1, 1947, and ending June 30, 1948, she was paid 
the sum of $540.00; and for the fiscal year beginning 
July 1, 1948, up to and including the 31st day of ~lay, 
1949, and prior to the filing of her petition herein, she 
was paid the sum of $550.00 ; and since filing her pe-
tition she has been paid the further sum of $50.00. 
The plaintiff is a widow of the age of seventy (70) 
years. She is also retired by the Utah State Teachers' 
Retirement Board, and receives a monthly annu.ity 
therefrom in thH sum of $40.95. · Plaintiff is the owner 
of her own home, which she acquired by deed from her 
mother prior to her mother's death. 
The Legislature of the State of Utah, on March 10, 
1949, passed an Act effective May 10, 1949, entitled 
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"'Chapter 91, La\vs of Utah 1949, being au act relating 
to Public School Teachers' Retirement Associations; 
providing for the termination of public school teachers' 
retirement associations by election of the members; and 
providing for the manner in which such sums shall be 
distributed.'· That pursuant to said Act on the 24th 
day of May, 1949, the members of the Ogden City Public 
School Teachers' Retirement Association held what 
was-denominated as an election at which the Ogden City 
Public School Teachers' Retirement Association was 
purportedly terminated effective the 31st day of May, 
1949~ 
The Ogden City Public School Teachers' Retire-
ment Association now has funds and assets in excess 
of $71,000.00. 
Plaintiff petitioned that this Court issue its Writ 
commanding the defendants to refrain and desist from 
dissolving said Association and from distributing its 
funds and assets, or from petitioning the District Court 
of Weber County, Utah, for an order dissolving the 
Association and distributing its funds and assets pur-. 
suant to said Chapter 91, Laws of Utah, 1949, and com-
manding the defendants to continue payments of her 
annuity to the plaintiff. This Court issued an Alterna-
tive Writ and defendants have filed their answer to 
plaintiff's petition. The facts not admitted by the 
answer are stipulated, thus leaving issues of law to be 
determined. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
STATUTE ESTABLISHING TEACHERS' RETIRE-
MENT AS,SOCIATION, TOGETHER WITH CON-
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TRACT PURSUANT THERETO WITH THE OGDEN 
- CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND PLAINTIFF'_S 
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, CONSTITUTES A 
BINDING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ASSOCI-
ATION AND THE PLAINTIFF, GIVING HER AND 
ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED A VESTED RIGH1, 
TO THE ANNUITY AT WHICH SHE AND SUCH 
OTHERS WERE RETIRED, WHICH VESTED 
RIGHTS CANNOT BE IMP AIRED OR REDUCE11 
BY AN ACT QF THE LEGISLATURE. 
The Statutory provision pertaining to Public School 
Teachers' Retirement Associations in cities of the first 
and sec.ond class (which we shall refer to hereafter as 
the ''Local Act'') are contained in Chapter 29 of Title 
75 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, be~ng Sections 75-29-1 
to 75-29-18 inclusive, amended as to Section 75-29-9 by 
Chapter 94 Laws of Utah, 1945. Formation of such 
local organizations was first author~zed by an act of 
our Legislature approved March 14, 1907. Hence laws 
proviaing for local retirement associations long pre-
ceded the law providing for a State wide Teachers' Re-
tirement Association, which was first enacted in 1935 
then repealed and subsequently enacted in 1937. It is 
very significant that when the 1937 State Teachers' Re-
tirement Act was adopted, it was incorporated into Chap-
ter 29 of Title 75 and its Section numbers begin con-
secutively following Section 75-29-18, which is the last 
section pertaining to the local Associations. Can there 
be any doubt that the Act creating the Associations in 
cities of the first and second class had the same purpose 
as to the educational systems in such cities as the Act 
creating the State wide Association had as to the State 
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Educ.a.tional System 1 We are c.ertain there can be no 
do.ubt, and therefore, the purpose of the Local Act is 
the same as the purpose of the State Act which was held 
in the c.ase of Driggs vs. Utah Teachers' Retirement 
Board, et al, 105 Utah, 417; 142 Pac. 2d. 657, to be im-
proving the educational system by better compensat-
ing the teachers and rewarding them for faithful and 
continued service thus making the profession more at-
tractive to qualified persons. 
The purpose of the Local Act being the same a.s 
the State Act, we submit that the decision of this Court 
in the Driggs case is controlling and is decisive of the 
case at bar. In the Driggs case the plaintiff having 
complied with the provisions of the State Act (part of 
the same Chapter 29 of Title 75) and having retired, 
was held to have a vested right in his annuity which 
could not be impaired by an Act of the Legislature 
passed after his retirement. Here the plaintiff, Florence 
Hirst Newcomb, having complied with the provisions of 
the Local Act (part of the same Chapter 29 of Title 75) 
and having retired, has a vested right in her annuity 
which cannot be impaired by an Act of the Legislature 
passed after her retirement. 
We ask the Court to bear in mind that when plain-
tiff was retired as a member of the Ogden City Public 
School Teachers' Retirement Association on· the 15th 
day of June, 1938, she ceased to be a member of the 
Association and was not a member when the Legislature 
on March 10, 1949, passed Chapter 91, Laws of Utah, 
·~. ·~J ' ,r~r'!I ''.4 1949. ·\'. ,~!. '·liifl~l 
Before retirement and while a member of the As-
sociation, plaintiff's membership in the Association was 
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compulsory, teachers being ex-officio members by virtue 
of their employment and it being compulsory to incor-
porate in their contract a stipulation agreeing to and 
being bound by all the rules and provisions governing 
membership. This is because of Section 75-29-8 ·of the 
Act, which provides, : 
"Every te,a.cher employed under written_ Q«;>n-
tract by the Board of Educ~tion of a· City of t~e 
first or. second class in which city a Teachers' 
Retirement Association has theretofore been or-
ganized shall, by virtue of such employment,_ p·e-
come a member of such retirement :;tssocia.tio"Q., 
and there shall be incorporated in the contract 
of employment a stipulation that the teacher 
agrees to and is bound by a~l the rules.' and pro-
visions governing membership in such associ-
ation." 
Also, before retirement, and while a member of the 
system, contributions in the form· of deductions from 
plaintiff's pay to the Association were compulsory. Sec-
tion 75-29-9 as it was. in effect at the time of plaintiff's 
retirement provides as follows : 
''The income of a public scho~l teachers' re-
tirement association shall be from the following 
sources: 
(1) All teachers who are members of a teach· 
ers' retirement association in cities of the first 
and second class shall have deducted from each 
and every payment for services one per _cent .of 
the amount due, and the amount of such deduct-
ion shall he certified to and paid by the Clerk of 
the board of edueation monthly to the trealSil!rer 
of the association; provided, that .an ann-q.al salary 
of $2,100 shall be the maximum salary on~ which 
,6 
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dues shall be deducted, and if any teacher shall 
receiYe a salary in excess. of such sum, the de-
duction shall be made on $2,100 only. 
(2) The board of education shall pay an 
amount equal to the total amount paid to the 
public school teachers' retirement association 
fund by or on behalf of all teachers during each 
year under the provisions of subdivision (l) of 
this section. The amount so payable by the board 
of education shall be paid over to the treasurer 
of the association in semi-annual installments. 
(3) All monies received from donations, lega-
cies, bequests or otherwise for or on account of 
said fund. 
The retirement commission may increase or 
decrease the rate of salary deductions and the 
limitations provided in this section, if· the pro-
posed modifications have previously been ap-
proved by the board of education, and by two-
thirds of the ballots cast by the members of the 
retirement association, at an election, called by 
the retirement commission, and held, after notice 
thereof posted in each school building and at the 
administrative office, at l~ast ten days peri or to 
the day on which said election is held. ' ' 
This Section was amended by Chapter 94, Laws of Utah, 
1945, as follows : 
''The income of a public school teachers' re-
tirement association shall be from the following 
sources: 
(1) All teachers who are members of a teach-
ers' retirement association in cities of the first 
and, second class shall have deducted from each 
and every payment for services one per cent of 
the amount due, and the amount of such deduction 
shall be certified to and paid by the clerk of the 
7 f 
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board of education monthly to· ·the treasurer of 
the association; provided, that an annual salary 
of $2,500.00 shall be the maximum salary on 
which dues shall he deducted, and if any teacher 
shall reeeive a salary in excess of such sum, the 
deduction shall be made ~)n $2,500.00 only. 
(2) The board of education shall pay an 
amount equal to the total amount paid to the 
public school teachers' retirement association 
fund by or on behalf of all teachers during each 
year under the provisions of subdivision ( 1) of 
this section; provided, however, that if the rate 
of contributions of teachers has reached two per 
cent of the salary, as limited by the provisions 
of subdivision (1) hereof, the board of education 
may appropriate to the current fund of the as-
sociation such additional amount, not exceeding 
two per cent of the salaries of teachers for the 
year in which the appropriation is made, as may 
be required to meet any deficit occuring in that 
fund. The amount so payable by the board of 
education shall be paid over to the treasurer of 
the association in semi-annual installments. 
( 3) All monies received from donations, leg-
acies, bequests or otherwise for on account of 
said fund. 
The retirement commission may increase or 
de~crease the rate of salary deductions and the 
limitations provided in this section, if the pro-
posed modifications have previously · been ap-
proved by the board of education, and by two-
thirds of the ballots cast by the members of the 
retirement association, at an election, called by 
the retirement commission, and held, after notice 
thereof is posted in each school building and at 
the administration office, at least ten days prior 
to the day on which said election is held.'' 
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Section 75-29-11 specifies the retirement annuity, 
plaintiff coming within the provisions of Class B. there-
in designated. This Section reads as follows: 
~'There shall be two classes of beneficiaries 
under the retirement fund, viz., class A and Class 
B. 
Class ... A.. On the recommendation of the re-
tirement commission the board of education of 
the city shall have po,ver by a two-thirds vote to 
retire any member of the association who is men-
tally or physically incapacitated for the perform-
ance of duty where such teacher has taught in 
the city at least fifteen years, and his or her term 
of service aggregates thirty years, except as 
hereinafter provided, whether before or after, 
or partly before or partly after the passage of 
this chapter. Each teacher so retired shall be 
entitled to receive as pension an annuity equal 
to one-half of the average annual salary . drawn 
by such teacher for the five years next preceding 
retirement, but in case his or her years of teach-
ing shall not aggregate thirty years, but shall 
aggregate at least twenty years, he or she may 
be temporarily retired and shall be entitled to 
such a part of the annuity as his or her years of 
service are a part of thirty. Any teacher who 
has been retired under this class and who in the 
opinion of a physician selected by the retirement 
commission has recovered his mental or physical 
powers sufficiently to teach or earn a livelihood 
in some other manner, shall cease to draw an 
annuity under this classification. If such teacher 
does not recover he or she shall be transferred to 
Class B whenever he or ·she reaches the age of 
sixty, and the years of teaching experience plus 
the years of retirement for disability total thirty 
years. The years of retirement under the pro-
9 
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visions of Class A shall in all cases be counted 
as years of teachin~ service in computing qualifi-
cations for retirement under Class B. 
Class B. Any member of the retire·ment as-
sociation who has taught thirty years, one-half 
of whie:h time has been in the city in which the 
retirement association is located, and has reached 
the age of sixty years shall, upon his or her re-
quest or upon the recommendation of the retire-
ment commission and a two-thirds vote of the 
board of education of the city, be placed upon the 
retired list, and shall be entitled to an annuity 
equal to one-half of the average annual salary 
for the five years next preceding retirement; 
provided, that the maximum annuity paid to any 
teaeher under either Class A or Class B shall not 
exceed $600.00. '' 
Prior to the Driggs Case, this Court in the case of 
Schofield and Tingey vs. Z.C.M.I., 85 Utah, 281; 39 Pac. 
2d 342: 96 ALR 1083, even though the pension arrange· 
ment contained the language, ''The Board • ~ • reserves 
the right • • • to change the basis of pension allowances 
by increasing or reducing the same,'' held that after 
the nec.essary years had been served, the retirement age 
reached, and the pension fixed and allowed, the pen-
sioner's right was vested. Having so held with respect 
to such pension system established by private persons 
or :corporations, the problem of this Court in the Driggs 
case was whether the same law should be applied to a 
ease where the grantor of the pension is the State, and 
this Court held and is committed to the rule that the 
same law must also he applied to the State. 
Applying the rule, to which this Court is committed, 
to the case now before the Court, we submit that there 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is no distiuetion in principle between this and the Driggs 
case. Here, as pointed out, Florence Hirst Newcomb 
fulfilled all the conditions required to make her annuity 
payable, retired and thus had a vested and fixed right 
thereto. The source of the contributions here are de-
ductions from the Teacher's salary and contributions by 
the Ogden City Board of Education, a taxing unit whose 
funds are derived from taxation. 
In the Driggs case the result of the legislative act, 
if it had been upheld, \Yould have been to cut down the 
amount received by Driggs as his annuity. IIere the 
effect of Chapter 91, La\vs of Utah, 1949, would not only 
result in reducing plaintiff's annuity, but could wipe it 
out entirely. The Act reads as follows: · 
''AN ~~CT RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOL 
TEACHERS' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION; 
PROVIDING FOR THE TERMINATION 0]., 
A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' RETIRE-
MENT ASSOCIATION BY ELECTION OF 
THE ~IE~IBERS; AND PROVIDING FOR THE 
MANNER IN WHICH SUCH FUNDS SHALL 
BE DISTRIBUTED. 
Be it enacted by the- I~eg1.slature of the State of 
Utah: 
SECTION 1. Upon the written request of at 
least ten per cent of the members of a public 
school teachers' retirement association the re-
tirement commission shall or upon its own motion 
the retirement commission may cause an election 
to be held by the members of the association for 
the purpose of determining whether or· not the 
association and its retirement system be termin-
ated. The retirement commission shall cause 
each member of the association to be notified in 
11 
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writing by mailing to his last known address at 
least ten days prior to the election of the time, 
place and purpose of such election. 
If a majority of the ballots cast by the mem-
bers at such election favor termination of the as-
sociation, such association shall be terminated 
upon the effective date prescribed by the mem-
bers in such election. 
Immediately after such termination of the 
association, the retirement commission shall dis-
tribute all of the remaining funds and assets of 
the association to its members andjor annuitants 
andjor claimants in such manner and order as 
to the commission shall seem proper or shall 
petition the district court of the County within 
which the association is located for an order dis-
solving the association and distributing its funds 
and assets to such members andjor annuitants 
andjor claimants.'' 
It is admitted that the funds of the Ogden Public 
School Teachers' Retirement Association now amounts 
to approximately $71,000.00. If the Association termin-
ated and distributed its funds, even though the entire 
sum were distributed solely to the retirement annui-
tants, there being thirty-two ( 32) of the retired annui-
tants eaeh entitled to an annuity of $600.00 ·per year, it 
is a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate that the 
distribution would only pay the annuties for a period of 
less than four years. 
Hence, if Chapter 91 were held valid as to plain-
tiff and those similarly situated, their annuities would 
not only be reduced but in a comparatively short time 
their annuities for which they worked and which they 
relied upon receiving for the remainder of their live·s 
12 
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would b€l eut out. entirely. If retired teachers were thus 
left to the grim possibility that future legislatures, after 
their retirement, could impair and destroy their annu-
ities there 'vould not~have been the inducement for them 
to remain in the teaching profession and the very pur-
pose of the retirement act would be fustrated . 
.. .-\.ny argument as to power which might be claimed 
by defendants to modify or reduce the annuities of plain-
tiff and those similarly situated, is completely answered 
by the Z.C.nl.I. and Driggs cases. As was pointed out 
in the Z.C.M.I. case, there was a provision in the plan 
that the Company Board of Directors could increase or 
reduce the amount of the pension. This Court held that 
upon retirement, the plaintiffs' ceased to be members 
of the system and, therefore, were not affected by such 
provision which could only apply to members. In the 
case at bar plaintiff ceased to be a member of the Re-
tirement Association upon her retirement and no pro-
vision either in statute or rule o:r regulation purport-
ing to give power to modify or reduce her vested annuity 
could have any application to her and those similarly 
situated. 
Again we call the Court's attention to the fact tha.t 
plaintiff, upon retirement, ceased to be a member of 
the Retirement Association. Chapter 91, Laws of Utah, 
1949, provides for an election to be called upon written 
request of at least 10% of the members, or the Com-
mission on its own motion may call an election of the 
members for the purpose of determining whether the 
retirement system be terminated. The Commission is 
required to give notice only to members. Ballots are 
provided to be cast only by members. Hence this Act, 
13 
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by its ve,ry terms, can have no application to plaintiff 
and those similarly situated, nor can it affect their 
rights, they no longer being members at the time of the 
effective date of the Act. Surely~lection from which 
the plaintiff and those similarly situated are excluded 
cannot affect their vested rights. 
The act is not retroactive. 
In a later case, following the Driggs case, being the 
case of McCarrey vs. Utah State Teachers' Retirement 
Board 177 Pae. 2nd. 725, the purpos~ of the State Teach-
ers' Retirement Act was again stated by this Court, 
through Justice Wolfe, as follows: 
''The purpose of the Teachers' Retirement 
Act is to attract and to retain in public school 
systems qualified and experienced persons as 
teachers.'' 
Then this Court in the latest case, Gubler vs. Utah 
State Teachers Retirement Board 192 Pac. 2nd 580, 
again reaffirmed this principle. Justiee Latimer, writ-
ing the opinion, quotes with approval the following from 
Mahon vs. Board of Education of the City of New York, 
68 App. Div. 154; 74 N.Y.S. 172, 174. (At pages 583, 4 
of the Paeific ·2nd Reporter) : 
'These annuities, after the expiration of the 
period of active serviee, are not gratuities, but are 
in the nature of compensation for the services 
previously rendered, for which full and adequate 
compensation was not received at the time of the 
rendition of the services; in other words, it is, 
in effect, pay withhe.ld to induce long, continued 
and faithful serviee. Such statutes are designed 
to benefit the public service in tw~ ways : First, 
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by encouraging competPut aud faithful employees 
\Yho remain in the service, and refrain from em-
barking in other vocation~ ; and, second, by, re-
tiring- from the public service those who, by de-
voting their best energies. for a long period of 
years to the performance of duties in a public 
office or employment and by reason thereof, or 
of adYanced age, become incapacitated from per-
forming the duties as well as they might be per-
formed by others more youthful, or in greater 
physical or mental vigor. Provision is thus made 
for the partial support of such teachers when 
their retirement without. such provision was 
deemed inequitable, and, but for such_ provision, 
doubtless would not be enforced.' 
The local retirement act has the same purpose as 
the State Act with respect to inducing experienced teach-
ers to join and remain with the school systems in_cities 
of the first and second class and, therefore, retirement 
benefits of plaintiff and those similarly situated are 
in effect payment for services performed and no statute 
pa~sed subsequent to retirement can reduce or destroy 
the full payment which such retired teachers have a 
vested right to receive. 
Justice Wolfe, in his concurrence in the decision 
of the Driggs case, at Page 435, of the Utah Re·port, 
very succinctly stated the principle involved which is 
as applicable to this case a.s it was to the Driggs case, 
as follows: 
•' I think it sufficient to rest my concurrence 
on the ground that Driggs, having fulfilled all 
the conditions required to make the pension pay-
able had a vested and fixed right thereto. When 
' . . the employer promises to his employee prospect-
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ive periodic payments to commence after a cer-
tain tern1 of 8ervice and upon the fulfillment of 
other conditions, it constitutes an offer \vhich 
ripens into a contract upon the fulfillment of 
those conditions; the fulfillment of the eonditions 
which bTings the contract into being at the same 
time constitutes a performance of said contract 
on the part of the employee. This is true in prin-
ciple whether it is the State or a private party 
which makes the promise or holds out the induce-
ment.'' 
Although we affirm that the settled law of this 
State, applicable to this case, is established by the u tab 
decisivns, particularly the Driggs case, \Ve feel that it 
might be helpful to the Court to further reft~r to and 
quote from the Z.C.M.I. opinion and to cite and discusH 
some decisions from other jurisdictions. 
Z.C.M.I. in 1911 established a pension system ''for 
the purpose of promoting the welfare of the officers and 
employees of this institution, and to encourage long and 
faithful service.'' All officers and employees who had 
attained the age of 65 years and had served the company 
honorably for 20 years were entitled to retire with pen-
sion. The Board of Directors were to have power to 
increase or reduce the pensions at diseretion. The plain-
tiffs ~aving reached the specified age and served the 
required time were comp·elled to retire and the amount 
of their monthly pension allowances were fixed _by the 
Board. The contributions to the system were required 
from employees. The pensions were paid until 1932, 
the time of the depression, when the Board of Directors 
by resolution sought to reduce the amounts and the plain-
tiffs brought the action to enforee payment of the orig-
16 
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inal allo"~anres. rrhis ('~ourt held for plaintiffs. In the 
Z.C--..~1.1. case, ~Ir. Justire Larson in writing the unan-
imous opinion, so clearly states the cogent reasons for 
the decision that ,v·e here quote at some length from the 
opinion. .A.t pages :287-288 of the r:tah report it is said: 
··In the pension system here involved, the 
company said to its employees: Any one who shall 
ser,~e me faithfully for 20 years and attain the 
age of 65 years shall be entitled to retire with 
pension based upon his past salary, 'vhich· offer 
and promise is made to induce you to continue 
in my employ, to render faithful service to me 
without seeking other employment or worrying 
about provisions for your welfare when time takes 
its toll on your strength and opportunity. It is 
offered to 'promote the welfare of t~e employee' 
(to relieve him from worry and provide for his 
old age), and 'to encourage long and faithful 
service' (for the benefit of the company); the 
employee who has met the requirements 'shall 
be entitled to retire with pension,' not may be re-
tired with pension, but shall have the right to 
retire with pension. It further provides that 'the 
amount of pension to which an e·mployee is en-
titled at 65' (not that he may draw, but that be 
shall have a right to draw) shall be computed ac-
cording to his past salary and years of service. 
(Parenthetical expressions ours.) 
''Plaintiffs after this offer by the defendant, _. 
continued in its employment, served faithfully for 
20 years, and attained the age of 65 years. The 
board of pensions then 'determined their eligi-
bility to receive pension allowance '-that is, de-
termined that they bad met the requirements of 
the offer and had earned their pensions; it fixed 
the amount of pension and made the allowance 
17 
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of the same and retired the plaintiffs from fur-
ther service. Clearly, such facts, circumstances, 
and history do not evidence an offer of a gratuity, ,. 
but an offer to pay certain sums when plaintiffs 
shall have eompletely performed a certain set of 
acts, offered as an inducement to them to per-
form the acts, and given as a consideration for 
their eomplete performance. vVhen the plaintiffs 
had completely performed their· obligations and 
. the board of pensions had determined their right 
to pension, made allowanee thereof, and retired 
them, the contract was complete and binding, and 
not subject to modification by the company with-
out consent of plaintiffs. 
'' * * * Where services are performed undP-r 
a statute providing for pensions, the pension be-
comes part of the contemplated compensation for 
services, and in a sense becomes part of the con-
tract of employment. 43 C.J. 813, Langer v. 
Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A. 
571; MeLemore v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Or. 
228, 171 P. 390, 1049." 
And at Pages 292-293 of the Utah report, Justice Larson 
says: 
''Under the provisions of section 16 'the 
Board of Directors reserves the right to change 
or amend any of the foregoing rules and regu-
lations at any time and to change the basis of pen-
sion allowa.nees by increasing or reducing the 
same.' What rules and regulations may the hoard 
change? Why, clearly, the rules and regulations 
governing the conditions under which an em-
ployee may earn a pension; the rules governing 
the o hjects of the pension system 'to encourage· 
long and faithful service and promote the wel-
fare of its employees.' The rules affecting the 
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in~titution in its relationship to its employees as 
announced in the preamble may be changed. The 
institution has no rules and regulations govern-
ing its ex-employees or retired employees, and 
so could not change them. 
'~The board reser,~es the right to 'change 
the basis of pension allowances by increasing 
or redur.ing the same. ' The basis of pension 
allo"\\·ances is the basis fixed for computing the 
pension 'Yhen the same shall have been earned; 
"-hen the employee has met the requirements of 
the rules and regulations and is retired. What, 
then, has he earned as a pension~ The amount 
thereof is determined by the basis fixed in the 
rule, and, applying the formula or rule then in 
force to the facts in this case as to salary and 
time of service, the amount of his pension is de-
termined and allowed by the board of pensions, 
certified to the company and the employee then 
retired upon such allowance. Until the pension 
has been earned, until the employee shall have 
been found entitled to retire and to a pension, 
the Board of Directors reserves the right to 
change the basis of allowance, that is, the basis 
for computing the pension upon which the em-
ployee is to be retired. 
''The pension allowance is the amount al-
lowed by the pension board, the amount fixed by 
them as earned and due the employee upon his 
retirement. It signifies the determining of the 
amount earned as a pension, the approval of the 
amount by the pension board, and setting it up as 
a fixed charge that has been allowed against 
the institution. When it has been determined, 
fixed, and set up, when it has been allowed by 
the pension board and the employee retj red, 
there is no longer any reason in saying the board 
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can change the rule for computing and allowing 
·that which has already been computed, allowed, 
and a'varded as earned by and due the employee 
as a pension for his long and faithful service 
to the company. It seem's clear that Section 15 
and 16 ha:ve no application to a retired pensioner 
whose pension has been fixed and determined.'' 
The case of 0 'Dea v. Cook, et al., 169 Pacific 366 is 
the leading case in California on the subject of pensions 
and when they hec.ome vested contract rights in the 
pensioner. It has been followed many times in Cali-
fornia decisions and its holding is the law in that State. 
In the 0 'Dea case, one Edward 0 'De a was a member of 
the Police Department of San Francisco. While in the 
performance of his duties, he received injuries which 
later resulted in his death. At the time of these injuries 
there was a pension ordinanee in foree providing a pen-
sion for the families of policemen killed in the perform-
anee of duty. Between the time· of 0 'Dea 's injuries and 
his death therefrom, the San Franeisco ordinance was 
amended to require that death ensue within one year 
of injury to entitle the family to the pension. 0 'Dea did 
not die within the year. . When his widow sought her 
pension, she was met with the contention that the amend·· 
ment had deprived her of it so she brought an action in 
mandate. The Court held for the widow. We quote 
from Page 367 of the opinion as follows: 
''The refusal of the hoard to recognize the 
widow's claim was based upon its view that at 
the time of O'Dea's death, when the widow for 
the first time became entitled to a pension on 
account of death, the c.ontrolling law under which 
it could he granted was that found in the amend-
ment of 1913, and as 0 'Dea admittedly had not 
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died "·ithin one year from tht.\ date of his injury 
the "·idow's claim "'"as not allowable. Upon this 
appeal this is the proposition argued, and in the 
argument it is pointed out that the amendment 
was made to relieve from the uncertainty as to 
the length of time 'Yhich must elapse between 
injury and death, \\·hich uncertainty was noted 
in Ed,vards Y. Sweigert, 15 Cal. App. 503, 115 
Pac. 256. Further, appellant insists that the re-
spondent had acquired no vested rights to a pen-
sion which the amendment could not take away, 
and that whatever rights she did possess were, 
in fact, taken a"""ay by the amendment and by 
virtue of the fact that her husband did not die 
within one year after sustaining his injuries. 
• 'A pension such as this law contemplates 
is not a gratuity or a gift. If it were, all of the 
provisions pertaining to it would be void, under 
the Constitution of the State, Art. 4, Par. 31; 
Taylor v. Mott, 123 Cal. 497, 56 Pac. 256. .A 
pension is a gratuity only where it is granted for 
services previously rendered, and which at the 
time they were rendered gave rise to no legal ob-
ligation. United States v. Teller, 107 U. S. 64, 
2 Sup. Ct. 39, 27 L Ed. 352; Mahon v. Board of 
Education, 171 N. Y. 263, 63 N. E. 1107, 89 Am. 
St. Rep. 810; State, etc., v. Love, 89 Neb. 149, 
131 N. W. 196, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, Ann. Cas,-
1912 C. 542. But where, as here, services are 
rendered under such a pension statute, the pen-
sion provisions becomes a part of the contem-
plated compensation for those services, and so in 
a sense a part of the contract of employment it-
self. Hammitt v. Gaynor (Sup) 144 N.Y. Supp. 
123; State, etc. v. Love, supra; People, etc. Y. 
Abbott, 274 Ill. 380, 113 N. E. 696 * * * 
"It is a firmly established principle of ju--
dicial construction that pension statutes serving 
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a beneficial purpose are to be liberally construed. 
Walton v. Cotton, 9 How.· (60 U. S.) 355, 15 IJ. 
Ed. 658; Hanescom v. lVIalden, etc. Gas Light Co., 
220 Mass. 1, 107 N. E. 426. Ann. Cas. 1917 A 145. 
''A fundamental and universal rule in the con-
struction of statutes is that they shall be given 
prospective effect and not retrospective effect, 
unless such latter effect is made c.ompulsory by 
the language of the act itself. Vanderbilt v. 
all Persons, 163 Cal. 507, 126 Pac. 158.'5' 
The O'Dea case was followed by the California Court 
of Appeal in the case of Klench v. Board of Pension 
Fund Commissioners 249 Pacific 46. Th~re the police 
pension system of the City of Stockton ·was involved and 
the Court held that the retired pensioner had a ve·sted 
right to his pension which could not subsequently be cut 
down. We quote the following from page 49-50 of the 
opinion: 
'' lVloreover, while no public officer of em-
ployee of the government is entitled as of right to 
a pension (Douglas v. Pension Boa.rd of the City 
of Sacramento et al. (Cal. App~) 242 Pae. 756), 
still, when once the government establishes a 
retire:rne:nt pension system for it~ officers and 
employees and provides· the funds a.nd means 
for administering it according to its design, any 
such offieer or employee, when the conditions 
arise or occur upon which, under the rules and 
regulations of the system, he becomes eligible to 
be retired and plaeed upon the pension roll, and 
he having met all the ·requirements entitling him 
to be so retired has in fact been retired and en-
rolled upon the pension list, has then a.cquired a 
vested right to draw his pension and to receive 
as such whatever sum or sums of monev mav be 
provided for such purpose for officer~ or ·em-
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ployees of the e}ass to \Vhic.h he belongs. rrhe 
petitioner here .. as the admitted averments of the 
petition disclose, had become elig·ible, under the 
terms of the Pension Act of 1889, to be retired. 
__._o\ll the eonditions upon 'vhich his retirement on 
a pension could be effected had occurred, and he 
"·as accordingly legitimately retired and placed 
upon the pension roll. His right to he paid the 
money proYided for police officers of his class or 
rank had become vested and hence it does not lie 
within the power of the city council by ordinance, 
or by inaction '\Yith respect to the enforcement 
of such ordinance, in effect to destroy that right, 
until the conditions upon which he was retired 
and placed upon the pension roll have ceased to 
exist. Kavanagh v. Board of Police Com'rs, 134 
Cal. 50, 52, 66 Pac.. 36; Cohrn v. Henderson, 19 
Cal. App. 90, 91, 124 P. 1037; Sheehan v. Board of 
Police Com'rs, 47 Cal. App. 29, 34, 190 P. 51; 
0 'Dea v. Cook et al., 176 Cal. 659, 661 et seq., 169 
P. 366. 
''The cases of Pennie v. Reis, 80 Cal. 266, 
22 P. 176, and Clarke v. Reis, 87 Cal. 543, 25 P. 
759, involved situations entirely different from 
that presented here. In the Pennie case the 
statute authorizing insurance benefits for. the 
widow or family of police officers were repealed 
before the death of the officer whose legal suc-
cessor was attempting enforcement of the claim 
set up under the repealed statute. In the Clarke 
case the officer was dismissed from the depart-
ment before the happening of the contingency 
upon which, had it happened prior to his dis-
missal, he would have been entitled to a pension. 
In the Pennie case it was held, as also it was 
held by the Supreme Court of the UnitLd States 
to which that case was taken (Pennie v. Reis, 
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132 U. S. 464, 10 S. Ct. 149, 33 Ij. Ed. ·426), that 
the police officer concerned therein acquired no 
vested right in the moneys provided for the pay-
ment of police pensions or life insurance and 
that no such right conld ·be acquired 'until the 
event happens upon which the money was to be 
paid.' It was also so held in the Clarke case. 
These cases, however, at least inferentially sup-
port the view that, 'vhen the event or the con-
tingency happens upon which the officer is en-
titled to receive the money provided for pension-
ing him as a retired officer, then, in that case, 
the right to he paid such money is a vested right.'' 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the 
case of Dismuke v. United States 297 U. S. 167, 80 L. 
Ed. 561, involving the United States Civil Service Re-
tirement Act, at page 565 of the L. Ed. report, says: 
''The proviso withholding jurisdiction of 
suits on claims for pensions was a. part of the 
original Tucker Act, which became law March 3, 
1887, long before the enactment of the Retire-
ment Act of May 22, 1920, and at a time when 
the term 'pensions' commonly referred to the 
gratuities paid by the government in recognition 
of past services in the Army and Navy. The 
annuities payable under the Retirement Act are 
not gratuities in that sense. The annuitant con-
tributes to them by deductions from his salary or 
by actual payments into the fund, as in the pres-
ent ease, and the scheme of 'the Act is to provide 
for payment of annuities, in part at least from 
contributions by employee·s, in recognition both 
of their pa.st services and of services to he per-
formed." 
The case of Talbott v. Indep~ndent School District. 
230 Iowa 949, 299, N. W. 556, 137, A.L .. R. 234; discusses 
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rights under a tParhers' retirement net. ThPre it iH held 
that the allo,Yauce is not a merL~ g-ratuity a11d awarded 
the teacher the amount "~hich vested at the date of her 
retirement. In an annotation to this case in 137 A.L.R. 
249-63 the annotator, at page ~49, ~ays: 
··The traditional rule that a pension g·ranted 
by public authority is not a contractual obliga-
tion, but a gratuitous allowance, iu the continu-
ance of " .. hich the pensioner has no vested right, 
but that it ma~~ be terminated at "~in by the au· 
thority bestowing it, is still adhered to, but the 
number of cases ''hich ~ts application has been 
deemed proper has diminished, in comparison 
with those upholding· as vested, at least in a lim-
ited sense, rights of beneficiaries under various 
retirement pay and other plans similar in nature 
to adjusted compensation and insurance features. 
The growing number of such cases is, of course, 
due to the adoption and extension of such systems 
to greater numbers and groups of ·employees in 
all branches of public and semi-public service. 
It may be observed that the right of a particular 
employee in a pension must be isolated a!!d deter-
mined by scrutiny of the details and provisions 
o~ the statute under which he claims.'' 
And at page 255 of the annotation, he say~: 
''And many cases have considered that where 
official allowance of a pension has been made, 
· under a detailed plan complete in its seope arid 
containing no express reservation or one implied 
in law from the nature of the statute or other 
situation inherent in it, the pensioner has a right 
to continued payment undiminished in amount.'' 
The Courts of Pennsylvania su~tain the proposi-
tion argued for by the plaintiff in the case at bar. In 
the case of McBride .v. Retirement Board et al. 330 Pa. 
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402, 199 Atlantic 130, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
held that a retired county employee had a vested right 
in his retirement allo,vance which the legislature could·· 
not impair. rrhe Court said (page 132 of the Atlantic 
report): 
"So strong is this vested right that it has 
been held that the contract clause of the Federal 
Constitution forbids impairment by the states 
not only by statute, but also by amendment to, 
or change of the state Constitution." 
The Court further stated (page 133 of the Atlantic re-
port): 
''Retirement pay is part of the compensation 
for services rendered during active employment. 
Plaintiff's rights under the retirement act, having 
vested upon his becoming eligible for retirement, 
could not be impaired by legislation.'' 
An analogous situation is presented by the Govern-
ment war risk insurance cases. The Supreme Court 
of the United States in the case of Lynch v. United 
States 29·2 U. S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 480, 78 L. Ed. 1434, held 
that the beneficiary of war risk insurance who had paid 
his premiums had a vested contract right and the 
United States could not impair it by subsequent legis-
lation. 
Crawford v. Teachers' Retirement Fund Associ-
ation 99 Pacific ( 2d) 729 is a ca.se decided by the Su-
preme Court of Oregon in 1940. The Court held that a 
teaeher who· retired under compulsory retirement pro-
vision after contributing to and complying with all the 
requirements of the system, had a vested right in her re-
tirement annuity which could not be impaired by subse-
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quent changes in the by-la\\·s of the A~~tH!iation, hold-
ing that the statute establishing the retirement system 
became a part of her contract. The Court said: 
· ~ '';" e think the trend of modern authority 
and the better-reasoned cases are to the effect 
that contractual relations are created and that, 
upon full performance by the annuitant, rights 
accrue "~hich cannot be impaired by subsequent 
legislation. · ' 
The Supreme Court of Washington in the case of 
In re Sanborn, 292 Pacific 259, decided in 1930, is one 
in which the interpretation of the Washing-ton Tea-
chers' Retirement System was involved. The Court, 
at page 261, said: 
""We grant the contention of repondent that 
the relation of the applicant is contractual and 
that bY" acceptance of the terms of the statute 
the teacher created a contract, the terms of which 
could not be impaired by the legislature.'' 
POINT 2 
CHAPTER 91, LAWS OF UTAH, 1949, SO FAR AS 
IT AFFECTS PLAINTIFF AND THOSE SIMILAR-
LY SITUATED, IS AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION 
OF POWER TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY AND 
IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE V, SECTION I OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Chapter 91, Laws of Utah, 1949, is heretofore set 
forth in full. Manifestly under this Act, the defend-
ants, as an administrative body, could distribute the 
funds and assets of the Association to the association 
members, andjor claimants, in such manner and order· 
as the defendants in their uncontrolled and unregulated 
discretion might determine, without any standards or 
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order fixed in the Act to control the exercise of the de-
fendant commission's diseretion; or the defendants, 
as such administrative body, could in its uncontrolled 
and unregulated discretion petition the District Court 
for an order dissolving the Association and distribut-
ing its funds and assets to the members, and/or annu-
, 
ants, andjor claimants. Under this Act, there being 
no control upon their discretion or standard set, the 
defendants could distribute all of the assets of the Ass-
ociation to the present members of the Association 
totally excluding the annuitants. We submit that such 
delegation of uncontrolled power is in violation of the 
settled general rule with regard to delegation of power 
to an administrative body. This rule is well stated 
in the case of Rowell, et al., vs. State Board of Agri-
culture, et al., 98. U tab 353, 99 Pac. 2d, 1. 
This Court, at page 358 and 359 of the Utah Re-
port, quotes with approval the rule as laid down in 
Thompson vs. ·Smith, 155 Va. 367,. 154 S. E~. 579, 584, 
71 A. L. R. 604 as follows: 
"It is a fundamental principle of our system 
of government that the rights of men a.re to be 
dete-rmined by law itself and not by the let or 
leave of administative officers or bureaus. This 
principle ought not to be surrendered for con-
venience or in effect nullified and function of 
the legislative branch of the government whether 
state or municipal, to determine and declare what 
the law shall be, and the legislative branch of the 
government ma.y not divest itself of this function 
or delegate it to executive or ·administrative 
ff. '' o 1cers .... 
''The majority of the cases lay down the 
rule that the statutes or ordinances vesting dis-
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cretiou in administiYt.~ officPrs aud bureaus must 
lay do"~n rules and tl~sts to guide and control 
them iu the exercise of thP discretion granted 
in order to be Yalid * • * . '' 
In the case of State ex rei Donaldson vs. Hind;~ 
182 Pac. 2d. 865 (Kans.) it is held 
.. A .. delegation of po\Yer to an administrative 
agency must fix a reasonably clear standard 
which goYerns the exercise of the power. A 
delegation of po"\\rer by the Legislature to an 
agency cannot be supported in total absence of 
a primary standard or a broad outline, nor can a 
standard be set " ... hich is so indefinite as to con-
fer an unlimited po\\Ter. 
The entire lack of any stand~rds to govern the dis-
cretion of the defendant commission is so fatal to the 
validity of this Act as to preclude it from being held 
valid in part under a~y exception to the general rule 
with regard to unlawful delegation of power. The 
case of State ex rei Donaldson vs. Hinds, supra, is. clearly 
in point. We quote the following from the opinion 
in that case, Page 876: 
''The general doctrine is that only the in-
valid parts of a statute are without legal efficacy. 
This is qualified by the further rule that if the 
void and valid parts of the statute are so con-
nected with each other in the general scheme ·of 
the Act that they cannot be separated without 
violence to the evident intent of the Legislature, 
the whole must fail.'' 
Thus it cannot be said that the portion of the Act 
which provides for termination of the Association i~ 
valid, even though there are no standards set for the 
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control of discretion in distribution of funds and assets~ 
because termination of the Association and distribution 
of its funds and assets are so indissolubly connected· 
that they cannot he separated without violence to the 
intent of the Act and, therefore, the lack of standards 
governing dis-cretion causes the whole Act to fail. 
The defendants in their answer have alleged that 
the Board of Education of Ogden City is a necessary 
party as a defendant in this action. The defendants filed 
a motion to amend the alternative writ by deleting 
from the order that portion thereof requiring· the de-
fendants herein to continue the monthly payments to 
the annuitants~ This motion was argued on the 18th 
day of July, 1949, and during the eourse of the argu-
ment, defendants' counsel argued that the Board of 
Education of Ogden City was a necessary party defend-
ant in order to properly adjudicate the matters before 
the Court. While the plaintiff claims th~t ~e ~chool 
Board is not a necessary party to this  the 
Court shall determine that the School Board is a nec-
essary or proper party to be joined in this action, th 
~be made a party de en ant to this action by order 
laintiff moves that the Board of Education of Ogdeii> 
of this Court and such reasonable time be given said 
Board in which to file such pleadings as it may desire 
so that it may have opportunity to be heard in its own 
behalf. 
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff is en-
titled to the relief prayed for and that the alternative 
writ should be made permanent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Samuel C. Powell, 
Derrah B. Van Dyke, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
